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Abstract
Market regulators emphasize that the reduction in dealers’ liquidity to today’s markets
is one of the drivers of extreme behavior such as flash crash. Yet, the challenge is
to understand the effects of intraday news flow on dealers’ quoting behavior, high-
frequency returns, price volatility, liquidity, and trading activity. This paper addresses
these issues shortly before the analyst recommendation changes on the Nasdaq. The
sample period is 2004 at times where dealers were frequently displaying their quotations
on the system. Results show that dealers remain active in quoting, in particular, in the
events when the report is issued by their affiliated analysts. Their activity is associated
with lower inside spreads, more trading, a more two-sided market and lower order
imbalance.
JEL classification: G1, G2.
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1 Introduction
Market liquidity is increasingly the focus among regulators and investors, and rec-
ognized as potential systemic risk. The current regulatory changes imposed by the
Dodd-Frank and Basel III Accords have been initiated to reduce systemic risk in terms
of strengthening the balance sheets and funding models of dealers1. Although the regu-
lation has made the system less levered, it has also led to a reduction of market liquidity
that has been traditionally supported by dealers 2 across many markets, such as equities
and bond markets. Without the dealers smoothing trading, certain markets have seen
sharper price movements, leading to more volatility overall.
There are now growing concerns regarding the reduced capacity of dealers to provide
liquidity and signs of increasing fragility in the market 3 4. For instance, the reduced
liquidity by dealers was one of the potential factors contributing to May 2010 flash crash
in the US equity markets 5, the October 2014 US treasury flash crash 6 and the most
recent October 2016 sterling flash crash. During these events, the market experienced a
rapid and large price swings and evaporation of liquidity in a short time period. Market
authorities claim that the situation might be different if market makers were providing
continuous order flow during these times of market stress 7. They argue that today’s
markets became fragile and unstable driven by structural imbalance in the ratio of the
1The initiatives are aimed to reduce the probability of banks becoming source of illiquidity conta-
gion, and protect from market abuse. In the United States, the trading requirement is implemented
as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In Europe, it is implemented by the European Commission.
2Market makers and dealers are used interchangeably.
3Mark Carney, speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, 2014 Monetary Authority of
Singapore Lecture.
4Jerome H. Powell, the Governor of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, ”Making
markets Fair and Effective for all”, January 20, 2015.
5The Commodity futures Trading Commission describes the flash Crash as follows: Between 1:41
and 1:44 p.m. CT, the E-mini S&P market price suffered a sharp decline of 3%. Then, at 1:45 p.m. CT,
in a matter of 15 seconds, the E-mini S&P market price declined another 1.7%. The price crash in the
E-mini S&P market quickly spread to major U.S. equities indices which suffered precipitous declines
in value of approximately 5 to 6%, with some individual equities suffering much larger declines.
6After the US Treasury market opened on October 15th, the yield on the 10-year Treasury, which
moves in the opposite direction of its price, plunged far below the 2.2 percent that it had closed at the
day before. By 9:36 a.m., it hit 1.9 percent. Then it snapped right back, and within 15 minutes, was
again trading above 2 percent.
7Mary L. Shapiro, speech by the SEC Chairman, ”Strengthening our equity market structure”,
Economic Club of New York, September 7, 2010.
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liquidity provided and liquidity demanded to the markets, and no longer seems to have
built-in liquidity shock absorbers.
Therefore, it is important to understand the role of dealers over time periods that
predominantly reflect stressful market conditions. This paper answers the following
questions: firstly, how would dealers behave around events that may create crowded
exit, e.g. unscheduled events? Unlike scheduled announcements, the market is not
prepared for these events. Consequently, traders are unwilling to trade and liquidity
evaporates. Secondly, how would dealers behave around news events where they may
have private information?
I evaluate this issue on the Nasdaq market circa 2004. Back then, Nasdaq deal-
ers were less constrained by regulations as the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
deregulated the minimum capital requirements for dealer banks freeing leverage from
regulatory constraints. This enabled dealers to maintain a large market presence, see
(Duffie, 2010). In the particular case of the Nasdaq, they were actively providing
liquidity on the system (Karam, 2018). The analysis is conducted around analyst rec-
ommendation changes. These news events are valuable as shown by Womack (1996),
are exhibited with information asymmetry in the market and are associated with higher
trading activity and higher price volatility, as shown by Irvine et al. (2007). I consider
two types of events: (i) the recommendation changes of affiliated analysts to market
makers and, (ii) the recommendation changes of non-trading analysts (with no affilia-
tion to market makers). I conduct the study on a sample of quotations that identifies
dealers’ identity collected from Nastraq data. I assess the impact of intraday news flow
on intraday volatility, liquidity, trading activity, order imbalance, and, dealers’ behavior
shortly prior the release of these analyst reports. The first question I address is whether
affiliated dealers display liquidity at the inside of the market prior to the news. It is
important to disentangle evidence of information asymmetry among dealers at times
when affiliated analysts issue the recommendation. I consider the case for dealers with
affiliated analysts who are indeed informed and the difference in information which dif-
ferentiates them from other dealers (the non-affiliated). My second research question
is whether liquidity improved at times when private information among dealers is more
important (the case of affiliation). I use the difference-in-differences to measure execu-
tion costs, price volatility, trading volume and quote-sidedness for a sample of Nasdaq
stocks over the two-hours before an event where the information is coming from an af-
filiated analyst as opposed to times where the information is coming from a non-trading
analyst (with no affiliation with any market makers).
The analysis across 155 Nasdaq stocks indicates that affiliated dealers increase the
time they spent at the inside bid (ask) of the market in the period leading up to the
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upgrade (downgrade) issued by their affiliated analysts. This implies that affiliated
dealers quote aggressively to attract more order flow prior to the news. No similar
patterns observed in the non-affiliated dealers’ behavior. Trading environments where
dealers have affiliation with the analyst issuing the recommendation seems to perform
better as opposed to environments where they may not be. Findings suggest narrower
inside spreads, more trades when the report is issued by affiliated analysts but higher
price volatility shortly before the release of the report. Using the Sarkar-Schwartz’s
(2009) quote sidedness, results suggest further that environments where affiliation exists
appear to be significantly more two-sided. The implication is that dealers’ activity ease
price discovery as buyers and sellers are both in the market, and this fact signals
liquidity creation around the news’ events. The significance of all these results above
does not depend on whether the non-news days or earnings announcements are used as
the control sample in the difference-in-differences analysis.
To obtain further insights, I sort stocks into two groups based on their excess of
inside spreads (relative to the average in the non-news sample), I find that higher
affiliated dealers’ activity is associated with more trading, greater volatility and lower
order imbalance for low inside spread stocks prior to the analyst report. No similar
pattern exists in the event period of the non-trading analyst. Dealers’ informational
advantage appears to allow them to trade more actively in the event period of their
analyst, in particular for the stocks with lower inside spreads. The increase in their
displayed liquidity is associated with more trading, lower order imbalance and more
two-sided markets and thus better market quality prior to their analyst report.
The present empirical results focus on a specific period where Nasdaq dealers were
voluntarily exposing their quotations on the platform, to gain reputation for good pric-
ing. The importance of clients’ relationship provide them incentive to provide market
making services even in less profitable markets. Results here suggest further that deal-
ers with affiliation seem to be particularly bound to keep providing liquidity in stressed
markets environments, in particular when they have access to their analyst report.
While other factors are behind the reduction in market liquidity to today’s markets,
one can conjecture that the reduced market making does seem to aggravate the shocks
to the markets during periods of stress.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the background
of the study and section 3 provides a general description of the Nasdaq market at the
time of the study. Section 4 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics.
Section 5 investigates dealer behavior around news events. Section 6 examines market
quality variables prior to the recommendation changes and outlines the econometric
methodology. Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 Related review
In addition to the views expressed by market regulators on the role of dealers in sup-
plying liquidity during times of stress, the academic theoretical literature expects the
intraday news flow to impact dealer behavior, execution costs, price volatility and trad-
ing activity. There is a vast literature on the impact of scheduled earnings announce-
ments, few studies however, examine the intraday news effects on trading activity, see
for instance Ranaldo (2008). I contribute to this literature by considering the impact
of the unscheduled news on dealer behavior and the corresponding market liquidity,
volatility and trading activity. This section draws on the related literature.
Evidence has confirmed information asymmetries among dealers prior to the news
coming from affiliated analyst to the market maker. In a market with information
asymmetry with one another, market makers differ: one may have the reputation to be
more informed than others, thus, maintaining presence in the market; others tend to
be anonymous or unknown. In asymmetric information setting, theoretical literature
assumes that the ability to hide the information by informed dealers deter price com-
petition among dealers, leading to a deterioration of liquidity, as in Calcagno and Lovo
(2006). Because the event is hampered by uncertainty about the value of the asset,
this magnifies the winner’s curse effects among dealers, which increases informed deal-
ers profits and decreases market liquidity. Alternatively, an access to the information
might provide dealers an advantage to provide aggressive quotations and yet benefit by
attracting order flow. Dealers would forgo opportunities to manipulate the market on
the short run, and be rather facilitating trades to protect their client relationships for
reputational reasons. For instance, an upgrade for the stock may lead to a sequence
of limit buy orders as long as the information is partially revealed in the price, and
assuming that dealers generally place limit orders. In these circumstances, a two-sided
market is likely to occur if the market is sufficiently competitive. Another strand of the
literature considers the informed dealers will use a mix of limit and market orders to
take positions in the transparent markets, as in Boulatov and George (2013). This re-
duces market making capacity at times of largely one-directional order flow, as a result
a one-sided market is likely to occur if dealers demand liquidity, instead of supplying
it. This might be accompanied by a deterioration of market liquidity.
Each of these patterns discussed above are likely to occur depending on dealer
motives for trading. I examine dealer behavior, and estimate the patterns of inside
spreads, price volatility, number of trades, and market sidedeness and order imbalance
in the period leading to the release of the affiliated analyst recommendation. I describe
the setting in the next section.
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3 Nasdaq environment in 2004
At the time of the study, the SuperMontage platform which was launched in 2002
allowed dealers to submit their quotations directly and execute trades through an elec-
tronic system but only for direct participants. This includes not only registered deal-
ers, but also the few ECNs who have agreed to participate to the system, e.g. BRUT,
Attain and Bloomberg Tradebook, and the order entry firms. Instinet and Island, the
largest ECNs in terms of market share on the NASDAQ, have merged their platforms in
February 2004 and formed INET. Archipelago also offered liquidity outside the Nasdaq
system. The non-participating ECNs were not reachable at all through SuperMontage.
It was only by early 2005 that Nasdaq has been able to provide SuperMontage users the
routing of orders out to Archipelago and INET through Brut which Nasdaq acquired in
September 2004. Even though trading was fragmented on the Nasdaq, SuperMontage
provided a centralized view of liquidity and executed almost half of the overall volume
in NASDAQ 100 index, and were the major contributors to liquidity in the less active
stocks. Table 1 displays results on trading activity and distribution of volume among
these three market centers, SuperMontage, Arca and Inet. Panel A contains shares of
trades divided into trade size categories, Panel B contains similarly divided shares of
trading volume; and Panel C displays shares of trading volume divided into trading
activity quintiles. The data reveal that SuperMontage executes about the majority
of trades in the sample. The two ECNs, Inet and Archipelago, complete respectively
about 17% and just under 25% of trades.
Dealers and participating ECNs displayed their quotations at multiple levels via
SuperMontage. Only dealers were required to maintain two-sided quotations which
have to be reasonably related to the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) without
any particular band . Market participants observe the identities associated with these
quotations on the platform. For instance, if Goldman Sachs or Knight quote at the
bid and ask under their identities, their quotations will be displayed via the TotalView
System and the Level II and will be associated to their MPIDs, i.e. MSCO and NITE
respectively. From the knowledge of the identity of the dealer for this quote, market
participants can infer the probable source of the quote. The quotations of dealers who
decide to quote anonymously through SuperMontage will be associated with the NSDQ
feature, named SIZE at the time of the study. This quoting facility was introduced in
2003 in attempt to compete with ECNs which provided the anonymous feature for a long
time. Dealers can alternatively display anonymous limit orders through ECNs. Order
entry firms route also orders to SuperMontage for execution against displayed orders and
quotations, and for display only under their NSDQ feature. However, their participation
to the platform was minimal about 1.5 % at that time so dealers were the main users
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of the NSDQ feature. Market makers were also executing orders through preferencing
and other fixed arrangements. It is worth noting that dealers at the time of the study
did not have to quote at the NBBO in order to internalize and many internalized trades
did not hit dealers’ quotations on the Nasdaq. SuperMontage users have the option to
submit reserve orders. These orders along with displayed ones are accessible through
NASDAQ trading platform but are not displayed. The NASDAQ system is programmed
in accordance with a price/time priority algorithm where displayed orders/quotations of
market participants are executed prior their reserve orders. Finally, during the market
opening, dealers were able but not obliged to display their quotations posted during
trading hours do have minimum required quantity, i.e. 100 shares whereas the pre-
opening don’t. The NASDAQ opening was a complete decentralized process until the
implementation of an electronic call auction, referred as Opening Cross in April 2004
and completed in December of that year.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The study uses one hundred fifty five Nasdaq stocks in 2004. The period of 2004 is
selected because at that time dealers were displaying frequently but selectively their
quotations under their market participant identifiers for reputational reasons on the
Nasdaq platform, see (Karam, 2018). Thus, the feature of the market is of sufficient
size to warrant interest on their role in supplying liquidity to the market during market
stress.
I collect recommendation changes from the Institutional Brokerage Estimates Sys-
tem (I/B/E/S) files and earning announcements are used to check the robustness of the
results. The sample for the study is constructed by first selecting 155 Nasdaq stocks
for which both the date and the timing of the recommendations are available. Each
observation in the database I/B/E/S represents a recommendation by a brokerage firm
or individual analyst. I classify these recommendations changes into upgrades, down-
grades or reiterations (no changes). I do not take into consideration the level of changes
in the classification of recommendation. Most recommendations in the sample occur in
the morning hours. Data for companies are collected from the CRSP and the Nastraq
database. The latter reports the best inside quotations in its inside file that I use to
measure execution costs and price volatility. Volume is extracted from Nastraq trade
files. To purge the data of potential errors, I delete trades and quotations for which: (1)
The trade price is zero or missing. (2) The quote is missing or negative. (3) The quoted
bid-ask spread is negative. (4) The quoted bid or ask size is negative. (5) The trade
and quote price is outside the regular hours. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the
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155 sample stocks. On average, there are 57 market makers with 15 financial analysts.
Price is on average $ 22.28 per share. The total market capitalization, based on closing
price and total shares outstanding during November 2004 is on average $5.93 billion.
Dealers’ identities in Nastraq quote files are used in the matching with the I/B/E/S
analyst code. This allows me to recognize the brokerage firms that can provide research
coverage and market making for every Nasdaq stock in the sample. I identify the deal-
ers with analyst affiliation, and divide the sample into recommendations coming from
affiliated analysts to dealers, to the ones coming from a non-trading analyst.
Once I break the sample of market makers using Huang (2002) classification, affili-
ated dealers in the sample are mostly institutional brokers or wirehouses. Institutional
brokers include Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman
Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Banc of America and UBS. The wirehouses in-
clude Merrill Lynch and Prudential. Wholesalers such as Knight and all other dealers
who do not have research departments are considered in the ”non-affiliated dealers”
category. Back in 2004, dealers were less constrained by regulations, thus were taking
risks to provide liquidity across a large sample of stocks. Unreported results describe
the average market makers in each category, including banks that failed in the crisis,
such as Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. Affiliated dealers on av-
erage are large in size with a leverage of 25 almost. Once I break the sample into
institutional versus wirehouses and wholesalers, results show uniformity across dealers
with no significant variation. On average, dealers were large on size with high leverage
ratio. Given Schultz (2003) argument that analyst coverage provides an informational
advantage to the market maker from the same bank, I can think of the set of affiliated
dealers for a given stock of being more informed about the forthcoming report of their
analyst, and some who are relatively more uninformed about the same report.
5 Univariate analysis around unpredictable news
Unlike earnings announcements, analysts’ recommendation changes are not scheduled,
thus not predictable. Thus, insiders may have private information regarding the time,
the content and the sign of the news. I test the important hypotheses concerning
dealer behavior at times of market stress, and the effects this may have on liquidity
and efficiency.
5.1 Dealer behavior at times of affiliated analyst report
I first test whether the information produced by an affiliated analyst influences the affil-
iated market maker to quote aggressively, as opposed to the market makers who are not
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affiliated. If information is what is behind the more active role of the affiliated dealers,
differences should emerge on how different market makers react to announcements.
At the level of each bank, I examine the relative timing of the decisions to provide
the recommendation and/market making. The two measures of dealers’ behavior used
prior and after to the two hours of the public release of the affiliated analysts are:
(1) the relative frequency affiliated dealers quote per interval, and the average relative
frequency that non-affiliated dealers quote at the same interval; (2) the proportion of
time the affiliated dealer is at the inside, and the average proportion of time the non-
affiliated dealers are at the inside. I focus on the difference between the event interval
of the variable, Event Name, and the Control Mean. Differences are computed as raw
deviations or as percentage of deviations. I compute the equally weighted average of
raw deviations across all recommendations in the upgrade and downgrade samples for
ask and bid prices separately.
Market making around upgrades
Table 3 shows that for upgrades, affiliated market maker’s relative frequency at the
inside ask decreases significantly. The other market makers decrease the time they
quote at the inside ask around the announcement, but this decrease is not significant
during event and control periods. Table 3 shows also that the affiliated dealers quote
more aggressively on the bid side before the upgrades. The increase in the relative fre-
quency at the inside bid (3%) and the time at the inside bid are significant (4.37%) in
the two hours period leading to the announcement. The results for other market makers
have less pronounced pattern, an insignificant increase at the inside bid followed by a
decrease prior one and half-hour of the announcement and a significant increase at the
inside ask. The results suggest that affiliated dealers tend to quote aggressively on the
bid side in the period leading to the upgrade. It could be possible that affiliated dealers
not only use this strategy, but complementing by quoting anonymously. The results
for the anonymous activity show further a slightly increase at the inside bid one hour
and a half prior to the announcement and a significant increase at the inside. Recall
that even if affiliated dealers choose to quote anonymously, other market makers may
use this option too, which may obscure the ask and bid quotations. Results suggest
that the relative frequency at both sides of the market in the half-an-hour before the
announcement appears to be significantly high anonymously. A plausible explanation
is that non-affiliated dealers may quote more frequently anonymously to explore the
market if they notice something.
Market making around downgrades
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Downgrades provide a useful motivation to examine market making during times of
market stress. I examine whether dealers decide to limit their exposures rather than
absorb inventory from clients looking to sell. Thus, I examine whether the role of dealers
as drivers of market making accentuated in anticipation of a sell-off. At these times,
market liquidity may deteriorate albeit to a lesser extent than seen during the financial
crisis. Before a downgrade, the results of table 3 show that the proportion of time
affiliated dealers quote at the inside ask increases significantly during two intervals out
of four prior to the downgrade. On the other hand, results show further that there is
a sudden increase on the bid side by affiliated market makers. The reaction of quoting
anonymously to a downgrade is more dramatic at the inside ask. The proportion
of time market makers quote at the inside ask increases significantly during the two
hours periods leading to the announcement as much as 9%, compared to the average
proportion of time at the inside ask during the control period. The non-affiliated dealers
exhibit a decrease in time at the inside ask and the inside bid prior to the downgrade.
The results for downgrades are also consistent with anticipatory quoting behavior by
affiliated dealers prior to the announcement.
5.2 Dealer behavior and market performance
The results of previous section confirm that affiliated dealers behavior is consistent
with anticipatory quoting behavior prior to the announcement of their affiliated ana-
lysts. While they seem to support market liquidity, an important question is whether
they were capable to facilitate matching of supply and demand at times of largely one-
directional order flow, as inventory risks become more difficult. Back in 2004, dealers
were willing to take on inventory risks, and were likely to support market liquidity at
these times. The importance of client’s relationship could explain why they continued
to provide liquidity during market stress. Observations from the markets tend to sug-
gest that dealers who need to protect a client’s relationship, were almost bound to keep
providing liquidity in stressed environments as discussed in Beau (2014).
Market performance in the presence of affiliation
In this section, I argue that the association that execution costs, trading activity
and volatility has with dealers’ quoting behavior provides further insights into the
underlying motives of trading where there is affiliation as opposed to periods where
there is no affiliation among dealers. I explore again the hypothesis regarding differences
in dynamics in dealers’ behavior and the corresponding market performance measures
across these news events. I further test the relationships between the measures of order
imbalance and dealer behavior across all events. I compute the order imbalance as the
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absolute value of buy and sell orders divided by the number of trades in each interval.
The affiliated market maker might use his quotations to signal the direction in
which the price should move to reflect the cost of providing liquidity and thus absorb
the order imbalance at these times. Thus, the information produced by a bank analyst
might be useful of reducing the adverse selection problem for that bank’s market maker.
To examine this idea further, I sort stocks by the excess inside bid-ask spread, as the
difference between the spread at the event time and the spread at the control sample
and consider the relationship with volatility, trading activity, dealers’ quoting behavior,
order imbalance and sidedness. Since the interest is in the event in which bid-ask spread
has decreased, i.e. lower adverse selection, I identify events with an unusually high
number of stocks in the low spread groups. After sorting stocks into two groups, low
spread (L) and high spread (H), I estimate the means differences in volatility, number
of trades, dealers quoting activity, order imbalance and sidedness. These statistics are
reported in table 5 an indicated by L-H (less minus high spread stocks). The results are
presented for upgrade and downgrade samples separately. A positive number indicates
a higher value for low-spread stocks. In the columns named No-News I show results for
the control sample with non-news.
For these events prior to upgrades, stocks in the low spread group have greater trad-
ing volume, higher volatility and significantly higher affiliated dealers quoting activity
on the bid side of the market in the period leading to the affiliated analyst reports, com-
pared to non-news events. Prior to a downgrade, stocks with low spread group exhibit
significant greater trading and higher activity by affiliated dealers at the inside ask.
However, there is no particular pattern observed in the non-affiliated dealers’ activity.
This is consistent with the possibility that in advance of a private information event,
affiliated dealers are more willing to trade in the market, implying more trading and
lower order imbalance. An increased participation at the inside ask (bid) by affiliated
dealers prior to upgrades (downgrades) appears to be associated with more trading for
low spread stocks. The non-affiliated dealers quoting patterns are not similar. This
suggests that they may be more reluctant to place competitive quotations in the peri-
ods of high event uncertainty.
Affiliated versus non-trading analyst report
To further disentangle the effects of inventory from those of information, I examine
the behavior of dealers surrounding the announcement coming from non-trading ana-
lyst. By comparing the behavior of both groups of market makers to their behavior in
a control period, strong statements can be made about the role that information plays
in separating dealers into two groups, prior to the announcement of the affiliated ana-
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lyst. Prior to upgrades and downgrades of non-trading analysts, the pre-announcement
periods are associated with more frequent trading and lower activity of dealers on both
sides of the market, compared to non-news events. However, by comparing the behavior
of both categories of dealers to their behavior in a control period, results suggest that
there were no differences in dealer behavior. Taken together, the results here suggest
that the information produced by the affiliated analyst actually influences the affiliated
market maker to trade aggressively by moving the bid and ask quotes, prior to the
announcement.
I continue the analysis by examining how the markets perform prior to the an-
nouncement of analyst reports, to draw clearer inferences on the effects of affiliation on
execution costs, price volatility and trading activity.
6 Difference-in-differences analysis
In the previous section, the results on dealer behavior and the corresponding market
liquidity, volatility and trading activity provide insights on market performance at
times of unpredictable news. Evidence of information asymmetry among market makers
suggested at times where affiliated analysts issue the recommendation. I consider the
case for dealers with affiliated analysts who might be indeed informed, and the difference
in information which differentiates them from other market makers. I shed empirical
light on how the markets perform when there is affiliation, as opposed to where this
affiliation does not exist. The arguments suggest that at times when some market
makers have privileged access to information, execution costs might be narrower relative
to those in other event periods, as affiliated dealers quote aggressively. This is consistent
with the notion that the analyst’s affiliation implies greater sharing of information and
thus less information asymmetry in the market. In the absence of this information
advantage, execution costs may be higher because of the greater probability of market
makers facing informed traders with advance knowledge of the forthcoming report. In
general, during unpredictable news events, one usually observes higher trading activity,
higher trading volume, and increased volatility exposing market makers to a greater
risk of holding undiversified portfolio. In response, market makers widen the bid-ask
spreads, resulting in less liquidity available to meet clients’ demand. As dealers became
more certain about the value of the asset, they will be more likely to provide liquidity
and this leads to narrower spreads, as in Copeland and Galai (1983). Thus, they will
be more likely to meet the unexpected demands.
In what follows, I empirically compare market performance for each stock in the
cases the change in recommendation is coming from an affiliated analyst to an event
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where the information is coming from a non-trading analyst. I use the difference-in-
differences analysis to make this comparison. These strategies are panel data methods
applied to sets of variables means in the case that some are in the affiliation sample
and others are not (as a control sample). Thus, the affiliation is the cause variable
of interest. The object of this methodology is to find some sort of comparison that
provides a compelling answer questions about the consequences of affiliation on market
performance variables. I use the same sample stocks to make the comparison. The
use of the same stocks is very important for identification to estimate what would have
happened in the variable when affiliation changes. I describe the methodology for the
market inside spread first, and then discuss the results for all the variables measuring
the quality of the market used in the study. Appendix A details the computation of
market microstrucutre variables I am using here.
Spreadi,t = β1Changest +β2Affiliationi,t +β3Affiliationi,t ∗Changest +αi + δt + i,t
(1)
Where Spread is the inside spread of stock i computed from the NBBO file (inside
file) during the half-hour period that starts at time t ; refer to the latter period as “inter-
val t”. δt is a time-specific fixed effect and αi is a stock-specific fixed effect. I consider
the inside spreads of a given stock in the affiliation sample (Affiliation=1) before the
news coming from the affiliated analyst and non-affiliation sample (Affiliation =0) be-
fore the news coming from a non-trading analyst, two hours prior to the announcement
(Changes=1) and 20 days before the event period non-news events (Changes= 0). The
effect of affiliation β3 is then obtained by:
DID = β3 =

(E[Spread/Changes = 1, Affiliation = 1]
−
E[Spread/Changes = 0, Affiliation = 1])
−
(E[Spread/Changes = 1, Affiliation = 0]
−
E[Spread/Changes = 0, Affiliation = 0])

(2)
I include controlling variables in the regression that affect the inside spreads such as:
the share price volatility, the trade size and the share price itself, since it is well known
that the inside spread is related positively to the price volatility and negatively to the
trade size and share price. I also include the number of analyst following the stocks and
the number of market makers in order to control for the degree of competition across
stocks. Note that the control variables are not orthogonalized. For example, the number
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of market makers and the number of analysts are correlated. Since they will not affect
the difference-in-differences coefficient, I prefer to focus on the Affiliation*Changes
dummy. The model is then presented in equation (3):
Spreadi,t = β1Changest + β2Affiliationi,t + β3Affiliationi,t ∗ Changest + β4tradesizei,t
+β5pricei,t + β6voli,t + β7mmcnt+ β8No.analyst+
4∑
j=1
βJDJ +
12∑
h=1
βhHh + i,t
(3)
Where Tradesize is the log of the trade size of stock i in “interval t”. Price is the
log of the mid-point of the bid ask quotations of stock i in “interval t”; vol is the share
price volatility in interval t, and provides a measure of the risk faced by market makers
when trading stock i ; mmcnt is the number of daily market makers following the stock.
No.analyst is the number of analysts following a stock during the whole period of the
study. Since the error terms will vary across the stocks, the model is estimated as a
fixed panel model, in which case the firm specific residual may be a dummy variable.
Moreover, in order to capture any deterministic component in the intraday dynamics
of the spread, I control for the time of the day effect; the first “interval t” starts at 9:30
AM and the last ends at 4:00 PM, which produces 13 intervals per day. I use the last
quote prior to the opening of the trading day as the first quote of the day, in order to
compute the time-weighted spread of the first quote. Equation (3) includes dummies
for each day of the week, Dj, in the sample.
6.1 Bid/Ask spreads
I measure the excess announcement trading costs by the inside quoted and effective
spreads when there is affiliation. It bears repeating that these spreads are the market
spreads computed from the inside file. These are the best bid and ask prices to buy and
sell a stock among the competing market makers and other market participants (the
NBBO). Having controlled for factors that affect the spreads (size of the trade, price,
share price volatility, number of market makers, number of analysts, time of day and
day of the week variations), I estimate the parameters from Equation (2).
Table 5 shows a statistically significant change in the mean inside spread, represented
by the Affiliation*Changes dummy coefficient. The excess of inside spread prior to the
announcement is lower than normal (-4.580) when there is affiliation, suggesting that
the environment of affiliation offers lower transaction costs in the period leading to the
announcement. I replicate the analysis by measuring the spread one hour before the
announcement instead of two hours. The results are quite similar.
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The Changes variable used in the regression separated dates on which there was a
recommendation change from those on which there was no announcement. As a robust-
ness check, the same study is replicated, where the variable Changes takes the value of
zero on earnings days and the value of one on days of recommendation changes, as be-
fore. With this new Changes variable, the same regression equation (2) is estimated. If
the Affiliation*Changes turns out to be significant once again, then it provides further
support that its significance does not depend on two different types of events (news and
non-news days) being used in the regression. Most of the earning announcements in the
sample are made in the afternoon. Unreported results are quite similar to the previous
ones. Transactions costs are lower when affiliation exists as coefficients are significant.
Taken together with the earlier ones, the results suggest that at times where there is in-
formation sharing between market makers and their financial analysts, market liquidity
increases, i.e. lower transaction costs.
6.2 Price volatility, number of trades and market sidedness
Historical returns are now going to be utilized in order to measure the implications on
stock return volatility. As in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), the sum of squared returns
(one-minute) over thirty minutes is computed, each return taken over a one-minute time
interval, both during the two hours and during the control sample preceding the news
release. Returns during the two hours preceding the news are very important for the
purpose of the study, because critical information concerning the trade process and the
impact of dealers’ behavior needs to be taken into account. The midpoint quotations
are used to obtain returns of each stock i over the one-minute interval mentioned above.
One minute returns, squared, are summed over thirty minutes and the sum is used for
obtaining an estimate of volatility. A concern with volatility is that large returns tend to
cluster together followed by periods of relatively small returns (GARCH effects). This
suggests that volatility is a temporally dependent (heteroskedastic) variable. There-
fore, the volatility calculated as previously is likely to exhibit serial correlation. Since
returns used in this study are computed using the midquote prices, any existing corre-
lation would not come as a result of bid-ask bounce. In order to take into account the
correlation, a separate equation for volatility is used in the regression which includes
autoregressive terms (GARCH equation). I use the trading volume and the spread
as control variables. The literature suggests that there is a positive linkage between
transaction costs and price volatility. The theoretical support is that the informational
arrival has the effect of widening the bid ask spreads and this induces an increase in
volatility. This effect impacts prices, which become more volatile, since price changes
are in response to information flow. In Table 6, results show that the pre-announcement
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price volatility is significantly higher two hours before the news release compared to an
hour of a non-announcement day. The coefficient of the interaction term is generally
less significant but positive. For sensitivity analysis, I examine another measure of
intraday volatility, i.e. the average volatility. The results are qualitatively the same.
Further results in Table 6 suggest that the affiliation is associated with a significantly
higher number of trades. The pre-announcement increase in the number of trades might
partially explain the reduction in the spread in the affiliation sample documented earlier.
The price volatility increase simply reflects information flows given the pre-disclosure
period has been a period of large revelation. Another plausible reason is that it might
result from order arrivals coming on both sides of the market. To investigate this
idea further, I use the market sidedness measure introduced by Sarkar and Schwartz
(2009). It consists on computing the correlation between the number of seller-initiated
trades and buyer-initiated trades in each interval. If the correlation is higher, this
implies that the market is two-sided as a result of order arrivals at both sides of the
market for the affiliation sample. Otherwise, the market is one-sided if the correlation
is negative, suggesting that the arrival is more buy-triggered (sell) trades in the interval
and accompanied by the arrival of fewer sell-triggered (buy) trades in the same interval.
Results on the sidedness in Table 6 suggest that the market is more two-sided when
affiliation exists: the correlation between the number of seller-initiated trades and the
number of buyer-initiated trades is higher for the affiliation sample, which signals the
creation of liquidity at times when the report is issued with the trading analyst.
7 Conclusions
This study examines the extent to which dealers display liquidity on electronic plat-
forms and the corresponding price volatility and execution costs, prior to the release
of recommendation changes. I use the affiliation between market makers and their
financial analysts as an information-based proxy to detect informed market making
empirically. I observe a two-sided market, lower spreads with relatively more trades,
and higher volatility when the report is issued from the affiliated analyst as opposed
to times where the report is issued from a non-trading analyst. The evidence suggests
also that trading appears to be associated with higher affiliated dealers’ activity at the
inside in the affiliation sample. This result implies that greater activity is associated
with higher displayed activity by dealers.
The findings have implications for liquidity creation, for the ability of dealers to
supply liquidity through electronic platforms, and for current policy debate in under-
standing dealers’ behavior when trading is likely to involve informed dealers. The
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reduction in the inside spread, and thus the improvement of liquidity when affiliated
dealers quote frequently is attributed to informational efficiencies which come as a re-
sult of decreased adverse selection costs. Such improvement in efficiency can indeed
generate an annual dollar saving in transaction for investors, and thus provide a high
market quality. To illustrate, an improvement due the information sharing on 79 mil-
lion dollars - the average trading volume of sample stocks - adds up to 55 thousands
on average per hour in reduced expected costs.
Finally, the platforms recently used for standardized OTC products are highly de-
pendent on dealers that provide liquidity also outside of these platforms (through in-
ternalization), i.e. the Swap Execution Facilities. Their use has been growing, al-
though from relatively low levels even in benign periods as noted by the pro-reforms
addressed by the Commissioner Giancarlo in January 2015. Market liquidity issues
may not be solved by electronic trading only, in particular on those platforms operat-
ing on anonymised basis. Looking at the Nasdaq setting in 2004, it seems that more
regulatory changes may be required to enhance the participation of dealers on these
platforms. For instance, dealers willingness to provide liquidity under their identities
on these platforms might be necessary for them to build reputation in the market and
maintain presence at times of stress, in line with the conduct of intermediaries on the
Nasdaq.
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A Description of variables
Variable Name Definition
Bid affiliated Proportion of time affiliated dealers spend at the inside bid of the market
Bid non-affiliated Proportion of time non-affiliated dealers spend at the inside bid of the market
Bid anonymous Proportion of time an anonymous quote under NSDQ is at the inside bid of the market
Ask affiliated Proportion of time an affiliated market spend at the inside ask of the market
Ask non-affiliated Proportion of time non-affiliated dealers spend at the ask inside of the market
Ask anonymous Proportion of time anonymous dealers spend at the ask inside of the market
BUY The number of buyer-initiated trades, determined by the Lee et al. (1993) algorithm
in the interval t
SELL The number of seller-initiated trades, determined by the Lee et al. (1993) algorithm
in the interval t
ZBUY [BUY-Mean(BUY)]/SD(BUY)], where Mean is the sample Mean
and SD is the sample standard deviation of BUY in the interval t
ZSELL [SELL-Mean(SELL)]/SD(SELL)], where Mean is the sample Mean
and SD is the sample standard deviation of BUY in the interval t
Sidedness The correlation between ZBUY and ZSELL in the interval t
Ntrades The total number of trades
Qspread The average proportional quoted half-spread in an interval t, defined as Q*(ask-bid)/M,
where M is the quote midpoint, Q is +1(-1) for a buyer-(seller-) initiated) trade
Espread The average proportional effective half-spread in an interval, defined as Q*(P-M)/M,
where M is the quote midpoint, P is the price, Q is +1(-1) for a buyer-(seller-) initiated trade
Volatility Standard deviation of returns in interval t, expressed as percentage
Order Imbalance The absolute order imbalance of (BUY-SELL)/Number of trades in interval t
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Table 1 – Trade market shares across venues in 2004 - Reported are percentage shares of trades
and trading volume on SuperMontage, Archipelago (Arca) and Inet for the sample of stocks. Results
contain trades that are reported between 9:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., in the second semester 2004. Panel
A contains market shares of trades aggregated into trade size categories; Panels B presents shares of
trading volume aggregated by trade sizes. P-Values are for the null hypotheses that market shares
across trading venues, trade sizes are identical. The p-values are calculated across stock-market and
stock-market-trade size observations.
SuperMontage Arca Inet p-Value
Panel A: Share of sample trades by trade size (%)
All trades 41.88 25.54 32.57 0.000
100-499 39.73 25.66 34.19 0.000
500-4,999 42.6 25.53 31.32 0.000
5,000-9,999 62.25 16.1 20.14 0.000
10,000 or more 79.03 8.65 11.08 0.000
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Share of trading volume by trade size (%)
All trades 60.08 17.75 22.22 0.000
100-499 43.26 24.31 32.51 0.000
500-4,999 66.84 15.64 17.56 0.000
5,000-9,999 87.07 6.56 7.89 0.000
10,000 or more 97.43 2.36 3.02 0.000
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
21
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of stocks sample – The table presents descriptive statistics
for the 155 stocks in the sample. Market capitalization is the computed as the mean daily market
capitalization during the second semester of 2004 using CRSP data. Price per share is the mean of
closing price during the second semester of 2004. Volatility is the standard deviation of CRSP daily
returns during the second semester 2004. Daily share volume is computed using the CRSP data. Daily
dollar volume is the volume computed from NASTRAD trade file during the sample period.
Quintile
Variable Mean Std Deviation 25% 50% 75%
(median)
Market Capitalization (in $ billions) 5.93 17.28 0.7 1.81 4.06
Price per share (in $) 22.28 18.95 7.4 18.77 31.73
Volatility (in %) 2.86 1.16 2 2.65 3.54
Daily share volume (in shares) 3 586 530 9 070 623 465 405 1 058 659 2 794 922
Number of market makers 57.35 18.26 43 55 70
Number of financial analyst 15.25 7.37 2 16 35
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Table 3 – Dealers’ quoting behavior around the affiliated analyst recommendations. This table presents descriptive statistics on
the relative frequency of quoting (R-Freq) and the proportion of time each category of dealers, i.e. affiliated, non-affiliated and anonymous,
is at the inside ask and bid in the two hours before and after the affiliated analyst recommendation for upgrades and downgrades. The
cross-sectional means of the raw deviations of the variables during the event period from the time of the day mean during the control
period are reported. Superscripts *,** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, and 5% levels, respectively.
Upgrade
Relative frequency and Proportion of time at the inside Ask Relative frequency and Proportion of time at the inside Bid
Half-hour Affiliated Non-affiliated Anonymous Affiliated Non-affiliated Anonymous
R-Freq Ask R-Freq Ask R-Freq Ask R-Freq Bid R-Freq Bid R-Freq Bid
-4 -2.35** 0.75* 2.15 0.98 0.92 5.11 2.76** 4.36** 5.25 4.09 -2.86 0.84
-3.00 -3.23** -0.73 0.01 -4.66 0.78 7.29 4.13** 1.69** 0.96 -1.07 1.62* 6.50*
-2.00 -1.98** -0.54 -3.02 -1.51 0.24 -2.27 0.02** 1.24 -1.62 -0.19 -1.23 -5.73
-1 -2.61** 0.02 -8.57 -5.56 5.03** -0.53 1.38** 5.39 -6.41 -3.77 2.94** -1.65
Event -0.84 0.89 -14.98 -12.05 0.76 6.04 -2.21 -0.75 -11.26 -8.98 -0.68 5.02
1.00 -3.10 -0.50 -6.85 -5.92 2.01 7.98 1.39 0.82 -11.93 2.00 3.91 8.23
2.00 -1.80 1.79 -6.12 -5.39 5.03 7.38 -1.89 -0.32 -8.17 -7.79 4.92 11.19
3 -3.07 -0.62 -1.68 0.12 2.10 3.36 -1.91 0.59 -5.77 -2.81 6.34 5.62
4 -1.54 1.13 -0.45 0.42 2.95 8.02 -2.04 -0.62 -1.57 -1.71 2.36 6.06
Downgrade
Relative frequency and Proportion of time at the inside Ask Relative frequency and Proportion of time at the inside Bid
Half-hour Affiliated Non-affiliated Anonymous Affiliated Non-affiliated Anonymous
R-Freq Ask R-Freq Ask R-Freq Ask R-Freq Bid R-Freq Bid R-Freq Bid
-4 -0.13* -0.05 -1.39 -1.30 7.94** 9.19** -0.06 0.26 3.58 0.09 0.54 4.14
-3 4.02** 0.95** -3.39 -2.13 3.42** 1.95** -3.66 -1.61 -1.41 -0.84 -3.13 -0.59
-2.00 -2.54 -0.44 -2.57 -0.43 3.57** -0.70 5.43** 7.75 1.37 1.96 -0.12 -3.51
-1 6.92** 3.52** -8.48 -5.16 4.74** 6.10** -3.29 -1.36 -3.06 0.15 2.32 1.35
Event -1.86 0.70 -13.9 -11.37 1.33** 6.77 0.59 0.61 -13.62 -11.16 2.65 4.50
1.00 -1.75 0.14 -13.43 -11.81 3.71 3.98 -2.30 -0.48 -12.19 -10.18 4.45 3.23
2.00 -1.24 0.13 -10.48 -9.95 7.22 7.94 -1.47 0.05 -8.84 -8.56 1.30 4.71
3.00 -1.81 0.94 -10.60 -7.30 5.14 3.74 -1.52 0.52 -7.96 -5.96 1.63 1.56
4 -1.71 3.11 -4.81 -3.34 1.16 1.68 -2.33 -0.78 -2.11 -1.16 1.36 0.09
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Table 4 – Sorting stocks based on spreads prior to news’ events. This table shows the differ-
ence in the means of number of trades, volatility and dealers’ activity at the inside for each category
of dealers, i.e. affiliated, non-affiliated and anonymous, and quote-sidedness for low and wide spread
stocks in the sample of non-news days, and of upgrades and downgrades two hours prior to the release
of affiliated and non-trading analyst reports. Superscripts *,** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, and 5% levels, respectively.
Variable Non-News Events Affiliated Analyst Non-Trading Analyst
Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade
L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H
Ntrades -49.78** 105** 70* 40.28** 64**
Order Imbalance -121** -42** -13* -380** -94**
Volatility -0.007 0.006** 0.004** -0.001** -0.023**
Bid affiliated 0.031 3.280** 0.005 -0.031 0.118
Ask affiliated 0.013 -0.087 4** - -0.001
Bid non-affiliated 0.601** -0.250** -0.126** -0.221** -0.231**
Ask non-affiliated 0.966** -0.261** 0.007 -0.419** -0.118**
Bid anonymous -5.460** -0.250** 0.018 0.013 -0.047
Ask anonymous -4.820** -2.610** -1.510* 0.070** -0.178**
Sidedness -0.006 0.117 0.090 -0.064 -0.109
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Table 5 - Inside spreads prior to news’ events - Time-weighted spreads, effective and quoted,
in an interval of thirty minutes, is regressed on constant and dummy variables in both periods: the
first dummy variable, Changes, is set to one on the two hours before the announcement and 0 on
hours of non-announcement days. The second dummy variable, Affiliation, equals one in the cases the
observation belongs to the affiliation sample and zero otherwise Zero in both cases. The third dummy
variable is used by multiplication (the interaction term) of the variables Changes and Affiliation. Con-
trol factors added to the regression are: price volatility, size of the trade, the price per share. There
are recommendation changes for 155 stocks in the sample: 56% of recommendations are coming from
non-trading analysts and 43% are done by affiliated analysts to market makers. Other control variables
included in the regression also are the time of the day and day of the week effects; coefficients are not
reported for brevity. The number in parentheses is the average standard error. The standard errors
are corrected for contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity. Superscripts *,**,*** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable Qspread Espread
Constant 16.003 16.351
(8.682) (13.765)
Changes 4.730** 3.111*
(1.181) (1.873)
Affiliation -5.198*** -3.456
(1.670) (2.648)
Affiliation*Changes -4.580*** -4.457*
(1.181) (2.469)
Price -0.297*** -1.100***
(0.109) (0.174)
Volatility -0.006*** 0.440***
(0.002) (0.003)
R-squared 0.14 0.40
No. of observations 11 647 855 11 647 855
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Table 6 - Price volatility, number of trades and quote-sidedness prior to news’ events.
This Table presents results on price volatility, volume and quote-sidedness two hours prior to the
release of the recommendation changes with Affiliation =1 is compared to the one corresponding to
observations with Affiliation =0. There are recommendation changes for 155 stocks in the sample:
56% of recommendations are coming from non-trading analysts and 43% are done by affiliated analysts
to market makers. Other control variables included in the regression also are the time of the day
and the fixed effects; coefficients are not reported for brevity. The standard errors in parentheses
are corrected for contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity. Superscripts *,**,*** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable Volatility Ntrades Sidedness
Constant 0.102 0.531*** -0.089
(0.102) (0.099) (0.058)
Changes -0.044 -0.501*** -0.041*
(0.029) (0.028) (0.022)
Affiliation 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.014
(0.041) (0.04) (0.022)
Affiliation*Changes 0.079** 0.038** 0.065**
(0.038) (0.017) (0.026)
Spread 0.116***
(0.009)
Trade Size 0.004
(0.009)
R-squared 0.10 0.15 0.08
No. of observations 11 647 855 11 647 855 11 647 855
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